fix(image-gen): route local-input credential guard through one shared chokepoint + cover xai (#57698)
Follow-up to the per-provider guards. Three improvements from review:
1. Extract agent.file_safety.raise_if_read_blocked() as a single shared
chokepoint and route the OpenAI, OpenRouter, and (newly) xAI image
providers through it, replacing the 3x-duplicated inline try/except.
Fixes the whole bug class: xai/_xai_image_field read a model-supplied
local path via open() with no guard — the same vulnerability the PR
fixed for OpenAI/OpenRouter, in a sibling provider it missed.
2. Strengthen the regression tests from pass-on-any-ValueError to true
security invariants: spy open()/read_bytes() and assert the blocked
credential is NEVER read; add negative controls (legit local image
still loads; remote/data: URIs pass through unguarded) so a
block-everything regression can't pass.
3. Guard is best-effort by design (defense-in-depth, not a security
boundary) — documented on the shared helper.
- agent/file_safety.py: raise_if_read_blocked()
- plugins/image_gen/{openai,openrouter,xai}: route through helper
- tests: no-read spies + negative controls across all three providers
This commit is contained in:
parent
587be5b5b4
commit
c1826e2690
7 changed files with 157 additions and 19 deletions
|
|
@ -304,6 +304,30 @@ def get_read_block_error(path: str) -> Optional[str]:
|
|||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def raise_if_read_blocked(path: str) -> None:
|
||||
"""Raise ``ValueError`` if ``path`` is a denied Hermes read (see
|
||||
:func:`get_read_block_error`), else return.
|
||||
|
||||
Shared chokepoint for provider input-loading sites that read a local
|
||||
file the model/tool supplied (e.g. image-gen ``image_url`` /
|
||||
``reference_image_urls`` paths). Centralizes the guard so every provider
|
||||
enforces the same read boundary with identical semantics instead of each
|
||||
open-coding the try/except block (#57698).
|
||||
|
||||
Best-effort by design: if ``agent.file_safety`` machinery is somehow
|
||||
unavailable at the call site the guard no-ops rather than breaking local
|
||||
image loading — consistent with the defense-in-depth (not security
|
||||
boundary) framing of the denylist itself. The blocking ``ValueError`` from
|
||||
a real hit still propagates; only unexpected internal errors are swallowed.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
blocked = get_read_block_error(path)
|
||||
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - guard must never break local-file loading
|
||||
return
|
||||
if blocked:
|
||||
raise ValueError(blocked)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Cross-profile write guard (#TBD)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -146,17 +146,10 @@ def _load_image_bytes(ref: str) -> Tuple[bytes, str]:
|
|||
if "image/" in header:
|
||||
ext = header.split("image/", 1)[1].split(";", 1)[0] or "png"
|
||||
return base64.b64decode(b64), f"image.{ext}"
|
||||
# Local file path.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
from agent.file_safety import get_read_block_error
|
||||
# Local file path — enforce the shared credential-read guard before reading.
|
||||
from agent.file_safety import raise_if_read_blocked
|
||||
|
||||
blocked = get_read_block_error(ref)
|
||||
if blocked:
|
||||
raise ValueError(blocked)
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
raise
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 - preserve existing local-file behavior
|
||||
logger.debug("OpenAI image input read guard unavailable: %s", exc)
|
||||
raise_if_read_blocked(ref)
|
||||
with open(ref, "rb") as fh:
|
||||
data = fh.read()
|
||||
name = os.path.basename(ref) or "image.png"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -97,16 +97,10 @@ def _to_image_url_part(ref: str) -> Optional[str]:
|
|||
if ref.startswith(("http://", "https://", "data:")):
|
||||
return ref
|
||||
path = Path(ref)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
from agent.file_safety import get_read_block_error
|
||||
# Enforce the shared credential-read guard before inlining local bytes.
|
||||
from agent.file_safety import raise_if_read_blocked
|
||||
|
||||
blocked = get_read_block_error(ref)
|
||||
if blocked:
|
||||
raise ValueError(blocked)
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
raise
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 - keep local image refs best-effort
|
||||
logger.debug("OpenRouter image input read guard unavailable: %s", exc)
|
||||
raise_if_read_blocked(ref)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
raw = path.read_bytes()
|
||||
except OSError as exc:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -137,6 +137,11 @@ def _xai_image_field(source: str) -> Dict[str, str]:
|
|||
import base64
|
||||
import os as _os
|
||||
|
||||
# Enforce the shared credential-read guard before reading local bytes
|
||||
# (same boundary the OpenAI / OpenRouter / Codex image providers apply).
|
||||
from agent.file_safety import raise_if_read_blocked
|
||||
|
||||
raise_if_read_blocked(source)
|
||||
with open(_os.path.expanduser(source), "rb") as fh: # windows-footgun: ok
|
||||
raw = fh.read()
|
||||
ext = (_os.path.splitext(source)[1].lstrip(".") or "png").lower()
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -135,6 +135,56 @@ class TestSourceImageLoading:
|
|||
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="credential store"):
|
||||
openai_plugin._load_image_bytes(str(auth_json))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_load_image_bytes_never_opens_blocked_credential(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
|
||||
"""The guard must fire BEFORE the file is opened — a credential store
|
||||
must never be read into memory (#57698). Spy builtins.open and assert
|
||||
it is never called for the blocked path."""
|
||||
hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
|
||||
hermes_home.mkdir()
|
||||
auth_json = hermes_home / "auth.json"
|
||||
auth_json.write_text('{"api_key":"sk-secret"}', encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(hermes_home))
|
||||
|
||||
import builtins
|
||||
|
||||
real_open = builtins.open
|
||||
opened: list = []
|
||||
|
||||
def _spy_open(file, *a, **k):
|
||||
opened.append(str(file))
|
||||
return real_open(file, *a, **k)
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(builtins, "open", _spy_open)
|
||||
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="credential store"):
|
||||
openai_plugin._load_image_bytes(str(auth_json))
|
||||
assert str(auth_json) not in opened, "blocked credential must never be opened"
|
||||
|
||||
def test_load_image_bytes_allows_legit_local_image(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
|
||||
"""Negative control: a legitimate local image path is NOT blocked and
|
||||
loads normally — proves the guard doesn't over-fire on everything."""
|
||||
hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
|
||||
hermes_home.mkdir()
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(hermes_home))
|
||||
img = tmp_path / "pic.png"
|
||||
img.write_bytes(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake-image-bytes")
|
||||
|
||||
data, name = openai_plugin._load_image_bytes(str(img))
|
||||
assert data == b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake-image-bytes"
|
||||
assert name == "pic.png"
|
||||
|
||||
def test_load_image_bytes_passthrough_data_uri_not_blocked(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
|
||||
"""Negative control: data: URIs are decoded, never routed through the
|
||||
local-path guard (the guard only applies to local file reads)."""
|
||||
import base64
|
||||
|
||||
hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
|
||||
hermes_home.mkdir()
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(hermes_home))
|
||||
b64 = base64.b64encode(b"xyz").decode("ascii")
|
||||
data, name = openai_plugin._load_image_bytes(f"data:image/png;base64,{b64}")
|
||||
assert data == b"xyz"
|
||||
assert name.endswith(".png")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestGenerate:
|
||||
def test_empty_prompt_rejected(self, provider):
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -181,6 +181,31 @@ class TestHelpers:
|
|||
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="credential store"):
|
||||
_to_image_url_part(str(auth_json))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_to_image_url_part_never_reads_blocked_credential(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
|
||||
"""The guard must fire BEFORE path.read_bytes() — the credential store
|
||||
must never be inlined into a provider request (#57698)."""
|
||||
from pathlib import Path as _P
|
||||
|
||||
from plugins.image_gen.openrouter import _to_image_url_part
|
||||
|
||||
hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
|
||||
hermes_home.mkdir()
|
||||
auth_json = hermes_home / "auth.json"
|
||||
auth_json.write_text('{"api_key":"sk-secret"}', encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(hermes_home))
|
||||
|
||||
real_read_bytes = _P.read_bytes
|
||||
read: list = []
|
||||
|
||||
def _spy_read_bytes(self, *a, **k):
|
||||
read.append(str(self))
|
||||
return real_read_bytes(self, *a, **k)
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(_P, "read_bytes", _spy_read_bytes)
|
||||
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="credential store"):
|
||||
_to_image_url_part(str(auth_json))
|
||||
assert str(auth_json) not in read, "blocked credential must never be read"
|
||||
|
||||
def test_extract_images(self):
|
||||
from plugins.image_gen.openrouter import _extract_images
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -492,3 +492,50 @@ def test_xai_image_field_expands_user_home(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
|
|||
field = _xai_image_field("~/pic.png")
|
||||
assert field["type"] == "image_url"
|
||||
assert field["url"].startswith("data:image/png;base64,")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestXAIImageFieldReadGuard:
|
||||
"""#57698: local image inputs must not read Hermes credential stores."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_xai_image_field_blocks_credential_store(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
|
||||
from plugins.image_gen.xai import _xai_image_field
|
||||
|
||||
hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
|
||||
hermes_home.mkdir()
|
||||
auth_json = hermes_home / "auth.json"
|
||||
auth_json.write_text('{"api_key":"sk-secret"}', encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(hermes_home))
|
||||
|
||||
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="credential store"):
|
||||
_xai_image_field(str(auth_json))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_xai_image_field_never_opens_blocked_credential(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
|
||||
"""Guard fires before open() — credential store never read into memory."""
|
||||
import builtins
|
||||
|
||||
from plugins.image_gen.xai import _xai_image_field
|
||||
|
||||
hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
|
||||
hermes_home.mkdir()
|
||||
auth_json = hermes_home / "auth.json"
|
||||
auth_json.write_text('{"api_key":"sk-secret"}', encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(hermes_home))
|
||||
|
||||
real_open = builtins.open
|
||||
opened: list = []
|
||||
|
||||
def _spy_open(file, *a, **k):
|
||||
opened.append(str(file))
|
||||
return real_open(file, *a, **k)
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(builtins, "open", _spy_open)
|
||||
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="credential store"):
|
||||
_xai_image_field(str(auth_json))
|
||||
assert str(auth_json) not in opened, "blocked credential must never be opened"
|
||||
|
||||
def test_xai_image_field_passthrough_url_not_blocked(self, monkeypatch):
|
||||
"""Negative control: remote URLs and data: URIs pass through unguarded."""
|
||||
from plugins.image_gen.xai import _xai_image_field
|
||||
|
||||
assert _xai_image_field("https://example.com/pic.png")["url"] == "https://example.com/pic.png"
|
||||
assert _xai_image_field("")["url"].startswith("data:image/png")
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue