fix(browser): narrow credential-query denylist to unambiguous names

Follow-up on the salvaged #49830 hardening. The contributor's sensitive
query-param set included bare English words (code, key, auth, session,
sig) that double as ordinary page facets — ?code= on promo/challenge
pages, ?key= as a search facet, ?session= on blogs — so web_extract and
cloud browser_navigate would refuse a large slice of normal browsing.

Narrow the set to unambiguously credential-named params (access_token,
authorization, client_secret, password, token, x-amz-signature, ...).
Prefix-based vendor-key redaction (is_safe_url) still catches recognizable
key shapes; this set is the belt-and-suspenders for opaque secrets carried
under an explicit credential-named parameter.

Also fixes two intra-PR-staleness test breakages surfaced by salvaging onto
current main:
- web_extract_tool() no longer accepts use_llm_processing= (signature
  changed since the PR was authored) — dropped the invalid kwarg.
- agent.redact now fully masks keyed 'token=<secret>' to 'token=***'
  instead of partial 'sk-...'; the console-redaction test now asserts the
  real invariant (secret body gone) rather than the exact mask format.

Added a regression test that generic English-word query params are NOT
blocked by the credential guard.

scripts/release.py

@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ AUTHOR_MAP = {
     "214165399+kernel-t1@users.noreply.github.com": "kernel-t1",  # PR #41349 salvage (.env sanitizer: only split when line starts with a known KEY= and preceding values are plain tokens; keep URL/query/whitespace secrets verbatim)
     "290858493+sasquatch9818@users.noreply.github.com": "sasquatch9818",  # PR #41198 salvage (defang untrusted-tool-result delimiter against tag injection; drop forgeable startswith fast-path)
     "jnibarger01@gmail.com": "jnibarger01",  # PR #35130 salvage (ReDoS-bound threat-pattern filler + FTS5 query cap + V4A Move-File approval/traversal targets)
+    "yong2bba@gmail.com": "yong2bba",  # PR #49830 salvage (harden browser tool safety boundaries: config-gated risky-eval blocklist, force-redact browser/CDP/supervisor output, session-ownership tracking, credential-query denylist)
     "info@djimit.nl": "djimit",  # PR #48034 salvage (recover from truncated gateway responses: 4 continuation retries + exponential token headroom + normalize empty partials)
     "lubos@komfi.health": "lubosxyz",  # PR #49225 salvage (persist codex app-server turns to session DB via agent_persisted=False so session_search/distill see gateway conversations)
     "290868363+petrichor-op@users.noreply.github.com": "petrichor-op",  # PR #41281 salvage (never persist ephemeral empty-response recovery scaffolding to the SQLite session store / JSON log; filter by flag not position)