Adds gateway.platform_connect_timeout (default 30s) to DEFAULT_CONFIG and
bridges it to the internal HERMES_GATEWAY_PLATFORM_CONNECT_TIMEOUT env var
at gateway startup, following the existing gateway_timeout config->env
pattern. The env var remains the manual-override escape hatch and wins if
set explicitly; otherwise config.yaml supplies the value. This closes the
issue's documentation/config-surface request (#19776 suggestion 2) on top
of the adapter ready-wait fix, so users no longer need an undocumented env
var to raise the Discord connect timeout.
Refs #19776
Cron pre-run scripts were capped at 120s by default, which surprised
users running long data-collection scripts on crons (the whole point of
crons being to offload long work). Raise _DEFAULT_SCRIPT_TIMEOUT to 3600s
(1 hour).
This bounds the script only — skill/agent jobs already run on a separate
inactivity budget (HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT, default 600s idle, 0=unlimited),
not a wall-clock cap. Scripts dispatch to a persistent thread pool and do
not hold the tick lock, so a long script doesn't starve other due jobs.
Docs clarified to make the script-vs-agent timeout distinction explicit.
env/config overrides (HERMES_CRON_SCRIPT_TIMEOUT,
cron.script_timeout_seconds) unchanged and still take precedence.
The original cap held a process-global slot across the WHOLE vision
analysis (image load + encode + LLM call) with a default of min(CPUs, 4).
That serialized legitimate multi-image workflows — "compare these 6
screenshots", "read this 10-page scan", "analyze every frame" — behind a
4-wide gate, and on the native fast path it even throttled calls that make
no LLM request at all. Excess calls queued (blocking acquire, nothing
dropped), but the latency hit on real fan-out was the wrong tradeoff.
The incident was CPU exhaustion, not call count: concurrent base64/resize
bursts saturated every core and left none to service the shared event loop
serving /api/status. So cap ONLY that:
- A dedicated, bounded ThreadPoolExecutor (_vision_cpu_executor) runs the
encode/resize/dimension-check off the caller's loop, sized to the host's
usable core count with NO fixed ceiling — the cap tracks the actual
exhausted resource (cores), not a magic number. Excess encodes queue on
the executor; cores stay free for the loop.
- The LLM call is deliberately OUTSIDE the executor, so multi-image
workflows keep full request concurrency.
- Override via auxiliary.vision.max_concurrency / HERMES_VISION_MAX_CONCURRENCY
(honored verbatim, including above core count); sub-1 ignored.
- _vision_concurrency_slot() is now a no-op shim for back-compat.
Tests assert: resolver defaults to host cores with no ceiling; env/config
override (incl. above cores); sub-1 rejection; the executor is dedicated and
core-sized; encode runs on a vision-encode thread; and crucially that encode
bursts are bounded to the cap while the analyses themselves stay fully
concurrent (calls_peak > cap).
A single agent turn can fan out N vision_analyze calls at once — the
classic trigger is "analyze every frame of this video", where ffmpeg
explodes a clip into dozens of frames and the model calls vision_analyze
on each. Every call does a CPU-heavy base64-encode/resize burst AND holds
a long-lived LLM stream open. The tool executor runs concurrent tool calls
on a per-session ThreadPoolExecutor (_MAX_TOOL_WORKERS=8), and multiple
agent sessions share one process (the dashboard runs the agent in-process),
so there was no global ceiling. In prod (June 2026) a video-frame fan-out
pinned a worker thread at ~100% CPU and starved the shared asyncio event
loop that also serves the dashboard's /api/status liveness probe, flapping
the instance to UNHEALTHY even though nothing had crashed.
Add a process-global threading.BoundedSemaphore that bounds how many vision
analyses run concurrently across the whole process, held across the entire
analysis (image load + encode + LLM call) in the single _handle_vision_analyze
chokepoint (covers both the native fast path and the legacy aux-LLM path).
It is a threading semaphore, NOT asyncio: each vision call is dispatched
through model_tools._run_async on a per-thread event loop, so an asyncio
primitive bound to one loop cannot coordinate across them. The acquire is
offloaded via run_in_executor so waiting for a slot never blocks the calling
loop.
Default: min(host CPUs, 4), floored at 1 — respect the host's concurrency,
or lower. Override via auxiliary.vision.max_concurrency (config.yaml) or
HERMES_VISION_MAX_CONCURRENCY (env). Values < 1 are ignored so the cap can
never be disabled into an unbounded fan-out.
Tests: bounded-fan-out regression guard + a control proving it would fail
without the cap; resolver tests for host-cpu default, ceiling clamp, low-cpu
host, env override, and sub-1 rejection. Pre-existing handler tests updated
for the now-async _handle_vision_analyze. Verified via the real
registry.dispatch -> _run_async per-thread-loop path (16 concurrent calls,
peak bounded to cap).
The Discord adapter could enter a silent zombie state after a network
outage / proxy stall: the process is alive, _client looks open, but the
underlying socket is dead. discord.py's WebSocket reconnect never sees a
RST through a wedged proxy/NAT, so client.start() spins forever without
exiting — which means the bot-task done callback (which only fires on
task completion) never trips either. The bot stays "offline" in Discord
until a manual `hermes gateway restart`. Reported offline for 13-17h.
Adds an out-of-band REST liveness probe in DiscordAdapter. Every
`discord.liveness_interval_seconds` (default 60s) the adapter issues a
cheap fetch_user(bot_id) — the same REST path as message delivery, so it
fails when the proxy/NAT is wedged. After
`discord.liveness_failure_threshold` consecutive failures (default 3) the
probe closes the wedged client and surfaces a retryable fatal error,
which trips the gateway's existing _platform_reconnect_watcher and
rebuilds the adapter. Operators disable it by setting either knob to 0.
Config lives in config.yaml (discord.liveness_*) per the .env-is-secrets
policy; _apply_yaml_config bridges it to internal env vars the adapter
reads, matching the existing HERMES_DISCORD_TEXT_BATCH_* pattern.
Co-authored-by: Hermes Agent <agent@nousresearch.com>
- Use os.pathsep instead of literal ':' so Windows paths (C:\dir) and
the Windows separator ';' work correctly.
- Add 9 tests covering multi-root behavior: writes inside first/second
root, writes outside all roots, trailing/leading/double separators,
all-separators edge case, static deny priority, duplicate dedup.
- Update hermes_cli/tips.py tip string to mention multiple paths.
- Update docs to mention os.pathsep / ; on Windows.
Follow-up for salvaged PR #49557.
Defense-in-depth for the dashboard plugin auto-import path. The web server
auto-imports and mounts the Python backend (dashboard/manifest.json -> api file)
of plugins found in ~/.hermes/plugins/ (user) and ./.hermes/plugins/ (project),
not just bundled plugins. So any plugin that reaches one of those dirs gets
arbitrary Python executed on the next dashboard start.
NOTE ON THREAT MODEL: #43719's originally-documented delivery chain (a public
--insecure dashboard + open API used to git clone a malicious repo into
~/.hermes/plugins/) is ALREADY mitigated on main — since the June 2026
hermes-0day hardening, a non-loopback bind ALWAYS requires an auth provider and
--insecure no longer bypasses the auth gate. This change is therefore NOT
closing that (now-authenticated) network path; it removes the residual
'arbitrary code executes merely because a plugin is on disk' hazard, which still
applies when a plugin arrives by other means: a socially-engineered git clone,
a supply-chain drop, an authenticated-but-malicious actor, or a future
regression in the auth gate. Untrusted on-disk code should not auto-execute.
Restrict dashboard backend Python auto-import to BUNDLED plugins only. User and
project plugins may still extend the dashboard UI via static JS/CSS, but their
api Python file is never auto-imported. Two layers: _discover_dashboard_plugins
scrubs api/_api_file for user/project sources (and bundled wins name conflicts
so a non-bundled plugin cannot shadow a trusted backend route);
_mount_plugin_api_routes re-refuses user/project at mount time. Tightens the
prior GHSA-5qr3-c538-wm9j / #29156 hardening (bundled+user) to bundled-only.
Salvaged from #44472 (@egilewski) onto current main.
* feat(providers): remove google-gemini-cli + google-antigravity OAuth providers
Google now actively bans accounts for third-party tools that piggyback on
Gemini CLI / Antigravity / Code Assist OAuth, and because abuse prevention
sits at a backend layer the ban can extend to the entire Google account
(Gmail/Drive), with a second violation being permanent.
Ref: https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli/discussions/20632
Removes both OAuth inference providers entirely (modules, provider profiles,
auth/runtime/config/models wiring, the /gquota Code Assist quota command,
the antigravity-cli optional skill, desktop + docs surface in en + zh-Hans).
The API-key 'gemini' provider (GOOGLE_API_KEY/GEMINI_API_KEY against
generativelanguage.googleapis.com) is unaffected and stays fully supported.
* fix(skills): keep the antigravity-cli skill — only the OAuth provider is removed
The antigravity-cli optional skill orchestrates the external `agy` binary as
a coding-agent tool via the terminal tool — it does NOT wrap Hermes inference
through the banned google-antigravity OAuth provider, so it carries none of
the account-ban risk that motivated removing that provider. Restore the skill,
its docs page, the sidebar entry, and the optional-skills catalog row. The
google-antigravity / google-gemini-cli inference providers stay fully removed.
* feat(cli): add --safe-mode troubleshooting flag
Inspired by Claude Code v2.1.169 (June 2026): run Hermes with all
customizations disabled to isolate setup problems from product bugs.
--safe-mode implies --ignore-user-config and --ignore-rules, and
additionally skips plugin discovery (hermes_cli/plugins.py) and MCP
server loading (tools/mcp_tool.py) via the internal HERMES_SAFE_MODE
env bridge.
* fix(desktop): keep composer usable during reconnect
- nous_subscription: gate the STT managed-default flip on openai-audio
entitlement and skip when a local backend (faster-whisper or custom
command) works; new _local_stt_backend_available() helper + tests
- whatsapp_cloud: WHATSAPP_CLOUD_{DM_POLICY,ALLOW_FROM,GROUP_POLICY,
GROUP_ALLOW_FROM} env overrides so both adapters can run in parallel;
normalize allowlist entries (JID/punctuation) to bare wa_id
- whatsapp_cloud: wrap per-message event build in try/except (dedup-marked
wamids would be silently dropped on Meta's batch retry otherwise)
- whatsapp_cloud: validate media_id before URL/filename interpolation,
delete transient .ogg after voice upload, FIFO-cap interactive-button
state dicts and per-chat wamid cache
- whatsapp_common: '# **Title**' headers no longer double-wrap asterisks
- setup wizard: read access token / app secret via getpass on TTYs
- docs: new WHATSAPP_CLOUD_* gating env vars
* fix(matrix): isolate room context and inbound dispatch
* test(matrix): cover room isolation and dispatch regressions
* docs(matrix): document room isolation and session scope
* fix(matrix): stabilize CI requirement checks
* test(matrix): isolate mautrix stubs in requirements tests
* fix(matrix): port room-scoped status and resume to slash commands mixin
Move Matrix /status scope output and /resume same-room guards from the
pre-refactor gateway/run.py into gateway/slash_commands.py so PR #18505
foundation behavior survives the upstream god-file decomposition.
Uses i18n keys for Matrix resume/status messages. Preserves upstream
session.py fixes (role_authorized, DM user_id isolation).
* docs(matrix): explain inbound dispatch via handle_sync loop
Document why Hermes uses an explicit sync loop with handle_sync() rather than
client.start(), aligning with upstream #7914 diagnostics while preserving
Hermes background maintenance tasks.
* fix(i18n): add Matrix resume/status keys to all locale catalogs
The Matrix /resume and /status slash-command keys added in the foundation
PR must exist in every supported locale file. tests/agent/test_i18n.py
asserts key and placeholder parity across catalogs.
Non-English locales use English strings as interim placeholders until
community translators can localize them.
* fix(matrix): restore gateway authz for allowed_users; honor config require_mention
Revert the early MATRIX_ALLOWED_USERS gate in _on_room_message so inbound
sender authorization stays in gateway authz like main. Parse require_mention
from config.extra (platforms.matrix / top-level matrix yaml) with env fallback,
matching thread_require_mention and fixing Forge when require_mention is set
only in profile config.yaml.
* fix(matrix): harden status scope and allowlisted DMs
* fix(matrix): use session store lookup for resume scope
* docs(dashboard): clarify auth provider suitability + document dashboard registration
- Add a 'Registering a dashboard' subsection under the Nous Research
provider covering both the 'hermes dashboard register' CLI command
and the Portal /local-dashboards GUI page.
- Note that the Nous provider is the one suitable for public-internet
exposure (logins verified against your Nous account).
- Add a warning that the username/password provider is for trusted
networks / VPN only and is not suitable for direct public-internet
exposure; point readers to the Nous / OIDC / custom OAuth providers.
- Surface the same distinction in the two-provider intro list.
* docs(dashboard): count three bundled auth providers, add self-hosted OIDC to intro
'Two providers ship in the box' undercounted — the bundled
plugins/dashboard_auth/self_hosted (generic OpenID Connect) is a third.
List all three in the gated-mode intro and link each to its section.
* docs(dashboard): extend auth provider updates to Docker and Desktop pages
- docker.md: list all three bundled gate providers (was username/password
+ OAuth only), adding the self-hosted OIDC provider and its env vars,
and note username/password is not for public-internet exposure.
- desktop.md: reframe the remote-backend connection so OAuth (Nous Portal)
is the preferred option for any backend reachable beyond the local
machine, with username/password positioned for local / trusted-network
use only. Cover the 'Sign in with <provider>' OAuth flow in the in-app
steps and scope the VPN warning to the password path.
* docs(dashboard): align env-var, CLI, and remote-Desktop recipe with provider changes
- environment-variables.md: reframe the Web Dashboard & Hermes Desktop
intro (OAuth preferred for remote/public, username/password for
trusted networks), add the self-hosted OIDC env vars
(HERMES_DASHBOARD_OIDC_*) that were missing from the table, and note
hermes dashboard register provisions the OAuth client_id.
- cli-commands.md: document the 'hermes dashboard register' subcommand
(flags, behavior, /local-dashboards GUI alternative).
- web-dashboard.md: apply the OAuth-preferred reframe to the bottom
'Connecting Hermes Desktop to a remote backend' recipe and scope its
VPN warning to the username/password path, matching desktop.md.
* docs(dashboard): move 'recommended remote Desktop path' framing from username/password to OAuth
The gated-mode intro list claimed the username/password provider was the
recommended path for a remote Hermes Desktop connection, contradicting the
OAuth-preferred framing established elsewhere. Move that recommendation onto
the OAuth (Nous Portal) item so the docs are consistent: OAuth is the
recommended provider for any remote/internet-facing backend; username/password
is for trusted networks only.
* docs(dashboard): drop unreleased managed/hosted-install provisioning notes
Remove the 'not available in managed/hosted installs, where the client id is
provisioned by the hosting platform' line from the dashboard register docs
(web-dashboard.md, cli-commands.md) and the 'provisioned by the Nous Portal for
hosted deploys' clause from the HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID env-var row —
that platform-provisioning path is unreleased.
* docs(dashboard): drop --portal-url / HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORTAL_URL from user docs
The portal-URL override targets a non-production Nous Portal and only works
for internal Nous usage — it won't function for end users (the access token
must be issued by the same portal). Remove it from the register CLI flags,
the Nous-provider config/env tables, and the verify-the-gate example so users
aren't pointed at an option that can't work for them.
* docs(dashboard): add worked examples for Nous and username/password providers
The self-hosted OIDC provider already had a full 'Worked example: Keycloak'
walkthrough; the Nous and username/password providers only had scattered
config snippets. Add parallel '#### Worked example' sections for both
(register/run/login + /api/status verification), mirroring the Keycloak
example's structure so all three bundled providers read consistently.
* docs(env): move HERMES_DESKTOP_REMOTE_URL to end of the dashboard auth table
It was sitting between the HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_* block and the
HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH/OIDC block, splitting the dashboard-side vars. As the
only desktop-side var in the table, it belongs at the end so the dashboard
provider vars (basic, OAuth, OIDC) stay grouped together.
* docs(dashboard): remove Fly.io references from dashboard auth docs
Fly.io is the internal hosting implementation for hosted Hermes — it shouldn't
leak into user-facing dashboard auth docs. Reword the OAuth provider intro,
the env-var-path rationale, the public-URL-override section, the cookie Secure
note, and the verify-the-gate example to generic 'hosting platform' / 'reverse
proxy' / 'TLS terminator' phrasing.
Left the legitimate user-facing Fly.io mentions in telegram.md (a deliberate
cloud-deployment walkthrough) and work-with-skills.md (a generic example)
untouched.
The documented path for connecting Hermes Desktop to a remote backend was
`--insecure` + a pinned HERMES_DASHBOARD_SESSION_TOKEN — an unauthenticated
bind plus a copy-pasted token. Replace it everywhere with the bundled
username/password dashboard-auth provider: set HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_*,
run `hermes dashboard --host 0.0.0.0` (the non-loopback bind engages the auth
gate), and Sign in from the app.
- desktop.md: rewrite 'Connecting to a remote backend' for the user/pass + Sign in flow
- web-dashboard.md: rewrite both remote-backend sections (overview + dedicated);
reframe the auth-gate section so --insecure is a discouraged escape hatch, not a
co-equal use case; drop the removed --tui flag from the systemd example
- environment-variables.md: lead with HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_*; drop the
session-token / HERMES_DESKTOP_REMOTE_TOKEN remote-connect entries
- docker.md: mention the username/password provider as the simplest gate provider
The dashboard's embedded Chat surface (/chat, /api/ws, /api/pty) was gated
behind `hermes dashboard --tui` / HERMES_DASHBOARD_TUI=1. The desktop app and
the dashboard's own Chat tab both drive the agent over the /api/ws + /api/pty
WebSockets, so a dashboard started without the flag would pass the /api/status
health check but slam the chat WebSocket shut with WS code 4403 — the app
connects, reports "ready", and chat stays dead. This was the root cause behind
multiple user reports of the desktop app failing to connect to a self-hosted
gateway/dashboard, and it bit Docker and host installs alike.
Make the embedded chat unconditional:
- web_server.py: _DASHBOARD_EMBEDDED_CHAT_ENABLED defaults to True; drop the
embedded_chat parameter and the runtime reassignment from start_server().
The WS gates still read the constant (now always true) so the seam — and its
"rejects when disabled" contract test — stays meaningful.
- main.py: remove the `--tui` argument from the dashboard subparser and the
`embedded_chat = args.tui or HERMES_DASHBOARD_TUI==1` derivation.
- web/: isDashboardEmbeddedChatEnabled() returns true unconditionally; drop the
deprecated __HERMES_DASHBOARD_TUI__ alias and the dead LEGACY_TUI_RE scrape in
the vite dev-token plugin.
- apps/desktop/electron/main.cjs: drop `--tui` from the spawned dashboardArgs
(it would now error with "unrecognized arguments: --tui") and the redundant
HERMES_DASHBOARD_TUI env injection.
- Docker: no s6 run-script change needed — the script never passed --tui; the
HERMES_DASHBOARD_TUI env var is now simply a no-op, so the image works out of
the box with no extra var.
- Docs: remove every dashboard --tui / HERMES_DASHBOARD_TUI reference across the
CLI reference, env-var reference, docker/desktop/web-dashboard guides, in-app
tips, and the zh-Hans translations. The terminal `hermes --tui` / HERMES_TUI
references are intentionally left untouched.
Tests: 270 passing across web_server, dashboard lifecycle, host-header,
auth-gate, and docker-override-scripts suites.
Add a 'Username/password provider (no OAuth IDP)' section to the web
dashboard guide (config.yaml + env surfaces, the explicit-secret caveat,
the rate-limit/generic-401 properties, and a 'write your own password
provider' pointer to the supports_password extension point), and list the
HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_* env vars in the environment-variables
reference.
The desktop Remote gateway field asks for a session token that Hermes never
surfaces — by default web_server.py mints an ephemeral token per boot and
injects it into the served HTML, so there is nothing in config.yaml, /gateway,
or env to copy. Document that you pin it yourself via
HERMES_DASHBOARD_SESSION_TOKEN, run the backend with --insecure (keeps the
legacy token auth path instead of engaging the OAuth gate), then paste that
value into the desktop app.
- web-dashboard.md: new 'Connecting Hermes Desktop to a remote backend' section
(backend + desktop steps, --insecure vs OAuth-gate nuance, HERMES_DESKTOP_*
env override, Tailscale guidance, troubleshooting).
- environment-variables.md: new 'Web Dashboard & Hermes Desktop' env-var table
(HERMES_DASHBOARD_SESSION_TOKEN, HERMES_DESKTOP_REMOTE_URL/TOKEN, the OAuth
and public-url vars) — none were previously documented.
On a fresh volume there is no gateway_state.json, so the boot reconciler
(cont-init.d/02-reconcile-profiles) registers the gateway-default s6 slot
but leaves it down — it only auto-starts when the last recorded state was
"running". A freshly-provisioned container therefore comes up with the
gateway down until something starts it (e.g. the dashboard's start button).
Add a generic, first-boot-only env-seed in stage2-hook.sh (which runs
before 02-reconcile-profiles): when HERMES_GATEWAY_BOOTSTRAP_STATE=running
and no gateway_state.json exists yet, seed {"gateway_state":"running"} so
the reconciler brings the supervised slot up on the very first boot.
This mirrors the existing HERMES_AUTH_JSON_BOOTSTRAP pattern: it seeds the
same state file the reconciler already consults, guarded by [ ! -f ] so
persisted runtime state always wins on later boots (a deliberately-stopped
gateway stays stopped across restarts). Only the literal "running" is
honoured (the sole value in the reconciler's _AUTOSTART_STATES).
Generic container contract — no host-specific code. Useful to any
orchestrator that provisions a blank volume and wants the gateway up from
first boot (the supervised gateway/dashboard already work on such hosts;
only the first-boot autostart was missing because the CLI lifecycle
commands can't drive the s6 layer when container self-detection misses).
Adds a shell-level contract test and documents the env var.
* remove Vercel AI Gateway provider and Vercel Sandbox terminal backend
Both Vercel-hosted integrations are removed end-to-end. Users on the AI
Gateway should switch to OpenRouter or one of the other aggregators
(Nous Portal, Kilo Code). Users on the Vercel Sandbox backend should
switch to Docker, Modal, Daytona, or SSH.
What's removed:
- `plugins/model-providers/ai-gateway/` provider plugin
- `hermes_cli/vercel_auth.py` Vercel-Sandbox auth helper
- `tools/environments/vercel_sandbox.py` terminal backend
- `ai-gateway` provider wiring across auth, doctor, setup, models,
config, status, providers, main, web_server, model_normalize, dump
- `vercel_sandbox` backend wiring across terminal_tool, file_tools,
code_execution_tool, file_operations, approval, skills_tool,
environments/local, credential_files, lazy_deps, prompt_builder,
cli, gateway/run
- `AI_GATEWAY_BASE_URL` constant, `_AI_GATEWAY_HEADERS` auxiliary-client
header set, run_agent base-URL header/reasoning special-cases
- `[vercel]` pyproject extra and `vercel`/`vercel-workers` from uv.lock
- env vars: `AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY`, `AI_GATEWAY_BASE_URL`, `VERCEL_TOKEN`,
`VERCEL_PROJECT_ID`, `VERCEL_TEAM_ID`, `VERCEL_OIDC_TOKEN`,
`TERMINAL_VERCEL_RUNTIME`
- Tests: deletes test_ai_gateway_models.py and
test_vercel_sandbox_environment.py; scrubs references across 23
surviving test files (no entire tests deleted unless they were
dedicated to AI Gateway / Sandbox)
- Docs: provider tables, env-var reference, setup guides, security
notes, tool config, terminal-backend tables — English plus zh-Hans
i18n parity
- `hermes-agent` skill: provider table entry and remote-backend list
What stays (intentional):
- `popular-web-designs/templates/vercel.md` — CSS design reference,
unrelated to Vercel-the-AI-product
- `x-vercel-id` in `stream_diag.py` headers — generic Vercel CDN
response header, useful diag signal on any Vercel-hosted endpoint
- `vercel-labs/agent-browser` URL in browser config — lightpanda
browser project, different OSS effort
- `userStories.json` historical contributor entry mentioning Vercel
Sandbox — archive, not active docs
Validation:
- 1153 tests in the 22 targeted files pass (`scripts/run_tests.sh`)
- Full repo `py_compile` clean
- Live import of every touched module + invariant check (no
`ai-gateway` in `PROVIDER_REGISTRY`, no `_AI_GATEWAY_HEADERS`, no
`vercel_sandbox` in `_REMOTE_TERMINAL_BACKENDS`)
* test: convert profile-count check from change-detector to invariant
The hardcoded "== 34" assertion broke when ai-gateway was removed.
Per AGENTS.md change-detector-test guidance, assert the relationship
(registry count >= number of plugin dirs) instead of a literal count.
Counts shift when providers are added/removed; that's expected.
The locale switcher appeared broken because hardcoded markdown links
(`](/docs/X)`) got double-prefixed by Docusaurus to `/docs/<locale>/docs/X`
(404) in non-English locales, and the MDX hero `<a href>` on the index
page escaped locale routing entirely.
Changes:
- Rewrite 922 `](/docs/X)` -> `](/X)` across 166 docs files (strip trailing
.md too). Docusaurus prepends locale + baseUrl itself.
- docs/index.md -> index.mdx; hero "Get Started" anchor -> Docusaurus
<Link> so it stays inside the active locale.
- Drop `ko` locale entirely from docusaurus.config.ts + delete i18n/ko/
(4 stale auto-translated kanban pages, <2% coverage, misleading).
Verified `npm run build` succeeds for both en and zh-Hans; `build/zh-Hans/
index.html` has no /docs/zh-Hans/docs/... double-prefixed paths.
PR2 will translate the 335 English docs into i18n/zh-Hans/.
Policy: if it ain't a secret it goes in config.yaml. HERMES_INFERENCE_PROVIDER
was leaking behavioral config into the .env surface, including from the gateway,
which bypassed config.yaml entirely.
Behavior:
- gateway/run.py: drop HERMES_INFERENCE_PROVIDER read in _resolve_runtime_agent_kwargs.
Gateway now flows through resolve_runtime_provider() with no `requested` override,
which reads model.provider from config.yaml first.
Docs/UX (strip env var from user-facing surface):
- --provider help text no longer mentions the env var
- cli-config.yaml.example same
- reference/environment-variables.md: remove HERMES_INFERENCE_PROVIDER row and
the cross-reference from HERMES_INFERENCE_MODEL
- reference/cli-commands.md: blank the env-var column for --provider
- guides/xai-grok-oauth.md, guides/minimax-oauth.md: replace
HERMES_INFERENCE_PROVIDER=x hermes invocations with config.yaml / --provider
- developer-guide/adding-providers.md, model-provider-plugin.md: reframe
Internal mechanism (kept as-is):
- hermes_cli/main.py writes HERMES_INFERENCE_PROVIDER into the TUI subprocess env
- tui_gateway/server.py reads it on TUI startup
- resolve_requested_provider() / oneshot.py / cli.py still fall through to the
env var as a last-resort behind config.yaml, which is what makes the TUI
parent->child handoff work
This stays. We just stop documenting it as a user knob.
Tests: tests/gateway/test_auth_fallback.py — simplify mock to fail on first
call, succeed on second; drop monkeypatch.setenv lines that no longer matter.
Supersedes #31064 (closed with credit to @novax635 who surfaced the underlying
issue but proposed aligning gateway *to* the env var rather than removing it).
Robustness:
- Surface 401/404 stream failures via _set_fatal_error() so the gateway's
runtime status reflects 'fatal: ntfy_unauthorized' / 'ntfy_topic_not_found'
instead of staying 'connected' when the reconnect loop halts. Matches
the pattern in whatsapp / telegram / sms adapters.
- Strip whitespace from auth tokens so pasted tokens with trailing
newlines don't produce malformed Authorization headers.
Simplicity:
- Extract _build_auth_header() and _truncate_body() to module-level
helpers, used by both NtfyAdapter and _standalone_send. Removes the
duplicated auth/truncation logic between the two paths.
Docs:
- website/docs/user-guide/messaging/ntfy.md — full setup guide,
identity-model warning, self-hosting, cron usage, troubleshooting.
- website/docs/reference/environment-variables.md — all 9 NTFY_* vars.
- website/docs/user-guide/messaging/index.md — platform comparison row.
- website/sidebars.ts — sidebar entry between simplex and open-webui.
Tests: 78/78 (+ 10 new robustness tests covering token hygiene, fatal
error propagation for 401/404, and the _truncate_body helper).
The reference entry now documents the truthy set
(``1`` / ``true`` / ``yes`` / ``on``) explicitly, matches the
falsy half (``0`` / ``false`` / ``no`` / ``off`` / empty string)
that the GHSA-5qr3-c538-wm9j fix re-aligned both the agent loader
and the dashboard web server around, and points readers at the
defence-in-depth rule that project plugins never have their
Python ``api`` file auto-imported by the dashboard regardless of
the env var.
Add an official, production-grade WhatsApp integration via Meta's
Business Cloud API as a complement to the existing Baileys bridge.
No bridge subprocess, no QR codes, no account-ban risk — at the cost
of a Meta Business account and a public HTTPS webhook URL.
Setup is fully wizard-driven: 'hermes whatsapp-cloud' walks through
every credential with paste-time validation (catches the #1 trap of
pasting a phone number into the Phone Number ID field), generates a
verify token, and ends with copy-paste instructions for the
cloudflared / Meta-dashboard / Business Manager pieces that can't be
automated. The wizard also points users at Meta's Business Manager
for setting the bot's display name and profile picture.
Feature set:
- Inbound: text, images (with native-vision routing), voice notes
(STT), documents (small text inlined, larger cached), reply context.
- Outbound: text with WhatsApp-flavored markdown conversion, images,
videos, documents, opus voice notes via ffmpeg with MP3 fallback.
- Native interactive buttons for clarify, dangerous-command approval,
and slash-command confirmation flows — matches the Telegram /
Discord UX, graceful degrades to plain text.
- Read receipts (blue double-checkmarks) and typing indicator,
using Meta's combined endpoint so they fire in a single API call.
- Webhook security: X-Hub-Signature-256 HMAC verification (raw body,
constant-time), wamid deduplication, group-shaped-message refusal
(groups deferred to v2 — Baileys still covers them).
- Full integration with the gateway's session, cron, display-tier,
prompt-hint, and auth-allowlist systems. Cloud and Baileys can run
side-by-side against different phone numbers.
Also wires STT (speech-to-text) through Nous's managed audio gateway
for Nous subscribers — previously the default stt.provider=local
required a separate faster-whisper install. New subscribers now get
voice-note transcription out of the box.
Docs: 418-line user guide at website/docs/user-guide/messaging/
whatsapp-cloud.md, sidebar entry, environment-variables reference,
ADDING_A_PLATFORM.md updated with the optional interactive-UX
contract for future adapter authors.
Tests: 100 dedicated tests for the adapter, 32 for the setup wizard,
20 for the Nous subscription STT wiring, plus regression coverage
across display_config, prompt_builder, and the cron scheduler.
Known limitations (deferred until clear demand signal):
- Group chats — use the Baileys bridge if you need them.
- Message templates for 24-hour-window outside-conversation sends —
reactive chat is unaffected; cron / delegate_task with gaps > 24h
will fail with a clear error. The agent's system prompt warns the
model about this so it knows to mention it when scheduling delayed
messages.
Follow-up to #29042 (xAI Web Search provider plugin). Adds xAI to the
canonical user-facing and developer-facing docs, with the search-only
caveat and the LLM-in-a-trench-coat trust model carried over from the
class docstring.
- user-guide/features/web-search.md
- Backends table: new xAI row + extended search-only note
- New 'xAI (Grok)' setup section with config knobs and trust-model
caution admonition
- Single-backend yaml comment now lists 'xai'
- Auto-detection table: explicitly note that xAI is NOT auto-detected
(XAI_API_KEY is shared with inference/TTS/image-gen so we don't
silently take over web for users who only set it for chat)
- developer-guide/web-search-provider-plugin.md
- Added plugins/web/xai/ to the 'study these next' reference list
- reference/environment-variables.md
- XAI_API_KEY description now also mentions web search
When Telegram topic mode is enabled, cron messages delivered to the bot's
root DM (TELEGRAM_HOME_CHANNEL without a thread id) land in the system
lobby — replies there are rebuffed with the lobby reminder and
reply_to_message_id is dropped, so users cannot interact with the cron
output (#24409).
Add an optional TELEGRAM_CRON_THREAD_ID env var that overrides
TELEGRAM_HOME_CHANNEL_THREAD_ID for cron deliveries only. Operators can
create a "Cron" forum topic in the DM, point this var at its thread id,
and replies to cron messages will land in that topic's existing session
instead of the lobby. The home-channel thread id (used elsewhere, e.g.
restart notifications) is unchanged, and explicit
deliver="telegram:chat:thread" targets continue to win over the env var.
Per the reporter's clarification on 2026-05-13, option (a) (cron-side
route to a dedicated topic + config knob) was chosen.
Fixes#24409
The Discord adapter silently dropped any attachment whose extension wasn't
in the SUPPORTED_DOCUMENT_TYPES allowlist (PDF, text family, zip, office).
Users uploading .wav / .bin / other unrecognized formats saw nothing in
their conversation — the file got logged as 'Unsupported document type'
and discarded before the agent ever saw it.
Add discord.allow_any_attachment (default false) to bypass the allowlist.
When on:
- Any file is downloaded, cached under ~/.hermes/cache/documents/, and
surfaced as a DOCUMENT-typed event with application/octet-stream MIME
- gateway/run.py already emits a context note with the cached path,
auto-translated via to_agent_visible_cache_path() for Docker/Modal
sandboxed terminals
- File body is NOT inlined — only the path — so binary uploads don't
blow up the context window
- Allowlisted text formats (.txt/.md/.log) keep their 100 KiB inline
behavior unchanged
Also adds discord.max_attachment_bytes (default 32 MiB matches the
historical hardcoded cap; 0 = unlimited) since users opting into arbitrary
types may want to raise the cap. The whole attachment is held in memory
while being cached, so unlimited carries a real memory cost.
Env overrides: DISCORD_ALLOW_ANY_ATTACHMENT, DISCORD_MAX_ATTACHMENT_BYTES.
Discord-only by deliberate scope. Telegram has hard 20 MB API limits and
Slack has its own caps — extending the same flag there is a separate
follow-up if/when requested.
The langfuse plugin is hooks-only (no toolsets), so it never appears in
`hermes tools` — that menu iterates `_get_effective_configurable_toolsets()`
(= `CONFIGURABLE_TOOLSETS` + plugin-registered toolsets), and "langfuse"
is in neither. The `TOOL_CATEGORIES["langfuse"]` setup wizard (with its
`post_setup: "langfuse"` hook that pip-installs the SDK and writes
`plugins.enabled`) was reachable only when a toolset key "langfuse" got
enabled, which can't happen — so it's been dead code, and the docs that
promised "Setup (interactive): hermes tools → Langfuse Observability"
were silently broken.
Right home for that wizard is `hermes plugins` (e.g. auto-running a
plugin's post-setup hook on enable), which is a generic plugin-setup
mechanism worth designing properly rather than shoehorning langfuse
back into `hermes tools`. Until that exists, point users at the
working manual flow.
Code:
- Delete `TOOL_CATEGORIES["langfuse"]` (24 lines) — unreachable.
- Delete the `post_setup_key == "langfuse"` branch in `_run_post_setup`
(29 lines) — only caller was the deleted TOOL_CATEGORIES entry.
Docs / comments (point at the manual flow + interactive `hermes plugins`):
- `plugins/observability/langfuse/README.md`: collapse the two-option
setup section to the single working flow.
- `plugins/observability/langfuse/plugin.yaml`: update `description`.
- `plugins/observability/langfuse/__init__.py`: update module docstring.
- `hermes_cli/config.py`: update inline comment above the LANGFUSE_*
env-var allow-list.
- `website/docs/user-guide/features/built-in-plugins.md`: collapse
"Setup (interactive)" + "Setup (manual)" into one accurate block.
- `website/docs/reference/environment-variables.md`: update the
cross-reference in the Langfuse env-vars section.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to #26534 (xai-oauth provider). The new guide and integrations
page were shipped with the salvage, but four reference/enumeration pages
still listed every other OAuth provider without xai-oauth:
- reference/cli-commands.md — `--provider` choices list
- reference/environment-variables.md — HERMES_INFERENCE_PROVIDER values
- user-guide/configuration.md — auxiliary-task provider list, OAuth
tip block (mirrored from MiniMax OAuth),
and provider table row
- user-guide/features/fallback-providers.md — provider table
Follow-up to the sandbox-bypass env-var fix:
- Update the opt-out gate so a user-provided AGENT_BROWSER_ARGS is also
respected, not just the legacy AGENT_BROWSER_CHROME_FLAGS. Previously
the gate only checked the broken legacy var, so a user who pre-set
AGENT_BROWSER_ARGS would still get clobbered by Hermes's auto-injection.
- Document AGENT_BROWSER_ARGS in .env.example, the browser feature page,
and the env var reference, with notes about the auto-injection on
AppArmor-restricted systems (Ubuntu 23.10+, DGX Spark, containers).
- Add Anadi Jaggia to AUTHOR_MAP.
Add NovitaAI as a first-class provider with dedicated model selection
flow, live pricing, and authoritative context length resolution.
- Register provider in PROVIDER_REGISTRY, HERMES_OVERLAYS, and all
alias/label maps (ID: novita, aliases: novita-ai, novitaai)
- Add dedicated _model_flow_novita() with 3-tier model list fallback:
Novita API → models.dev → static curated list
- Fetch live pricing from /v1/models with correct unit conversion
(input_token_price_per_m is 0.0001 USD per Mtok)
- Add Novita-specific context length resolution (step 4b) in
get_model_context_length(), prioritized over models.dev/OpenRouter
- Register api.novita.ai in _URL_TO_PROVIDER to prevent early return
from the custom-endpoint code path
- Add models.dev mapping (novita → novita-ai)
- Add default auxiliary model (deepseek/deepseek-v3-0324)
- Add NOVITA_API_KEY to test isolation (conftest.py)
- Update docs: providers page, env vars reference, CLI reference,
.env.example, README, and landing page
