Two platform-security hardenings:
- Matrix: _on_invite now checks the inviter against the existing
allow-list (_allowed_user_ids / GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS) before
auto-joining. Without this any federated Matrix user could invite
the bot into arbitrary rooms, exposing its presence and metadata.
The message and reaction paths already enforce this allow-list; the
invite path bypassed it.
- Mattermost: _api_get / _api_post / _api_put reject any path
containing '..'. WebSocket-event values (channel_id, post_id,
file_id) are interpolated directly into API paths, so a malicious or
compromised server could craft traversal payloads to make the bot
issue authenticated requests to arbitrary endpoints with its bearer
token.
The configurable-E2EE-passphrase change from the original PR is dropped:
the matrix adapter was rewritten onto mautrix and the passphrase-protected
key-export file no longer exists.
d836b2bac4