fix(browser): narrow credential-query denylist to unambiguous names

Follow-up on the salvaged #49830 hardening. The contributor's sensitive
query-param set included bare English words (code, key, auth, session,
sig) that double as ordinary page facets — ?code= on promo/challenge
pages, ?key= as a search facet, ?session= on blogs — so web_extract and
cloud browser_navigate would refuse a large slice of normal browsing.

Narrow the set to unambiguously credential-named params (access_token,
authorization, client_secret, password, token, x-amz-signature, ...).
Prefix-based vendor-key redaction (is_safe_url) still catches recognizable
key shapes; this set is the belt-and-suspenders for opaque secrets carried
under an explicit credential-named parameter.

Also fixes two intra-PR-staleness test breakages surfaced by salvaging onto
current main:
- web_extract_tool() no longer accepts use_llm_processing= (signature
  changed since the PR was authored) — dropped the invalid kwarg.
- agent.redact now fully masks keyed 'token=<secret>' to 'token=***'
  instead of partial 'sk-...'; the console-redaction test now asserts the
  real invariant (secret body gone) rather than the exact mask format.

Added a regression test that generic English-word query params are NOT
blocked by the credential guard.

scripts/release.py

@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ AUTHOR_MAP = {
     "214165399+kernel-t1@users.noreply.github.com": "kernel-t1",  # PR #41349 salvage (.env sanitizer: only split when line starts with a known KEY= and preceding values are plain tokens; keep URL/query/whitespace secrets verbatim)
     "290858493+sasquatch9818@users.noreply.github.com": "sasquatch9818",  # PR #41198 salvage (defang untrusted-tool-result delimiter against tag injection; drop forgeable startswith fast-path)
     "jnibarger01@gmail.com": "jnibarger01",  # PR #35130 salvage (ReDoS-bound threat-pattern filler + FTS5 query cap + V4A Move-File approval/traversal targets)
+    "yong2bba@gmail.com": "yong2bba",  # PR #49830 salvage (harden browser tool safety boundaries: config-gated risky-eval blocklist, force-redact browser/CDP/supervisor output, session-ownership tracking, credential-query denylist)
     "info@djimit.nl": "djimit",  # PR #48034 salvage (recover from truncated gateway responses: 4 continuation retries + exponential token headroom + normalize empty partials)
     "lubos@komfi.health": "lubosxyz",  # PR #49225 salvage (persist codex app-server turns to session DB via agent_persisted=False so session_search/distill see gateway conversations)
     "290868363+petrichor-op@users.noreply.github.com": "petrichor-op",  # PR #41281 salvage (never persist ephemeral empty-response recovery scaffolding to the SQLite session store / JSON log; filter by flag not position)

tests/tools/test_browser_console.py

@@ -112,9 +112,13 @@ class TestBrowserConsole:
             result = json.loads(browser_console(task_id="test"))
 
         serialized = json.dumps(result)
+        # The secret body must be gone. The exact mask format
+        # (partial ``sk-…7890`` vs full ``***`` for keyed ``token=`` values)
+        # is owned by agent.redact and intentionally not pinned here.
         assert "BROWSERCONSOLESECRET" not in serialized
-        assert "sk-" in result["console_messages"][0]["text"]
-        assert "..." in result["console_messages"][0]["text"]
+        redacted_text = result["console_messages"][0]["text"]
+        assert fake_key not in redacted_text
+        assert "***" in redacted_text or "..." in redacted_text
 
     def test_redacts_secrets_from_eval_result(self):
         from tools.browser_tool import _browser_eval

tests/tools/test_browser_secret_exfil.py

@@ -108,14 +108,36 @@ class TestWebExtractSecretExfil:
         from tools.web_tools import web_extract_tool
 
         result = await web_extract_tool(
-            urls=["https://example.com/callback?code=opaque-oauth-code"],
-            use_llm_processing=False,
+            urls=["https://example.com/callback?access_token=opaque-oauth-value"],
         )
 
         parsed = json.loads(result)
         assert parsed["success"] is False
         assert "credential-like query parameter" in parsed["error"]
-        assert "code" in parsed["error"]
+        assert "access_token" in parsed["error"]
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_allows_ambiguous_english_word_query_param(self):
+        """Generic query names that double as normal page facets must NOT block.
+
+        ``?code=`` (promo/challenge pages), ``?key=`` (search facets),
+        ``?session=`` etc. are ordinary browsing params. Only unambiguously
+        credential-named params are blocked, so web_extract stays usable.
+        """
+        from tools.web_tools import web_extract_tool
+
+        for url in (
+            "https://leetcode.com/problems/two-sum/?code=twosum",
+            "https://github.com/search?q=hermes&code=1",
+            "https://example.com/blog?session=summer",
+        ):
+            result = await web_extract_tool(urls=[url])
+            parsed = json.loads(result)
+            # Not blocked by the credential-query guard (may fail for other
+            # reasons like a missing backend, but never with this specific
+            # error string).
+            if parsed.get("success") is False:
+                assert "credential-like query parameter" not in parsed.get("error", ""), url
 
     @pytest.mark.asyncio
     async def test_allows_normal_url(self):

tools/url_safety.py

@@ -77,26 +77,28 @@ def normalize_url_for_request(url: str) -> str:
     return urlunsplit((parsed.scheme, netloc, path, query, fragment))
 
 
+# Query parameter names that are unambiguously credential-bearing. Kept
+# deliberately narrow: bare English words that double as normal page facets
+# (``code`` on promo/challenge pages, ``key``/``auth``/``session``/``sig`` as
+# search or routing params) are intentionally EXCLUDED to avoid blocking
+# ordinary browsing. Prefix-based token redaction (``is_safe_url``) still
+# catches recognizable vendor key shapes; this set is the belt-and-suspenders
+# for opaque secrets that carry an explicit credential-named parameter.
 _SENSITIVE_QUERY_PARAM_NAMES = frozenset({
     "access_token",
     "api_key",
     "apikey",
-    "auth",
     "auth_token",
     "authorization",
     "awsaccesskeyid",
     "client_secret",
-    "code",
     "credential",
     "credentials",
-    "key",
     "jwt",
     "password",
     "passwd",
     "secret",
-    "session",
     "session_id",
-    "sig",
     "signature",
     "token",
     "x_amz_security_token",